Russia on the Grand Chessboard

By locating its special troops, surveillance equipment and other forces in Central Asia and in the Caucasus after the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in 2011 the US will ensure its military presence right besides Russia’s “belly” near the northern border of Iran and the western border of China.


Alexander Shustov ( International Affairs magazine.)

The US plans to build military training centers in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. First these plans were announced last year and they received a wide response because earlier it had been announced that a Russian military base would be built in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Now Pentagon is not going to confine itself with Kyrgyzstan and plans to build military facilities on the territory of five states of the region. It implies the redeployment of part of military infrastructure of the US from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan and also the construction of NATO facilities there.

According to “EurasiaNet” (an internet-portal financed by George Soros), US Central Command’s counter-narcotics fund was to allocate more than $40 million for the construction of military training centers in the cities of Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Karatoga (Tajikistan), a canine center and helicopter hangar near the city of Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) as well as for the strengthening of border check points in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Pentagon estimates the construction of each border check point at $5-10 million. The location of the US border check point in Uzbekistan is not disclosed out but the location of the check points in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan is quite remarkable. The Serahs check point (Turkmenistan) is on the border with Iran and the Kyrgyz check point (where the modernization of electricity supply and water supply and sewerage system is planned) – near Batken. Both check points are of geo strategical importance - first in case of a war between the US and Iran and second - in case of destabilization of the political situation in this part of the Fergana Valley like it was in 1999-2000 during the invasion of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

In Kazakhstan the US plans to build a new helicopter hangar near the city of Alma-Ata, a canine center and a center for inspection of transport vehicles, with the total construction costs amounting to $10 million. In Tajikistan the Americans plans to build a military training center in Karatoga (not far from the capital of Dushanbe) for Tajik servicemen. There they plan to practice combat actions in city conditions of a city and to train sharpshooters/spotters. The construction costs are estimated at $10 million. A similar center worth $ 5.5 million for practicing different kinds of combat actions in the course of border and counterterrorist operations should be built in the Kyrgyz city of Batken.

It has been known about the US plans to strengthen its military presence in Central Asia since last autumn when the Northern supply route through Russia began to function alongside with the transport route from Pakistan. It is known that Pentagon is working on the plan to deploy elite units of its special troops in Central Asia namely four battalions of the 3rd Special forces (airborne) group which has a long experience of fighting in Afghanistan.

In addition to Central Asia the US plans to deploy its forces in Southern Caucasus - in particular early warning radars in Georgia. It is expected that besides the radars Pentagon may locate a land military base and a naval base in Georgia with 25,000 servicemen.

Finally Pentagon is to build a special operations complex in Afghanistan near the Uzbek border worth $100 million. The complex with the area of 6 hectares will be located in Mazar-i-Sharif, 275 km north-west from Kabul and 56 km south from the Uzbek city of Termez. In 18 months the Americans are to build a united operational center, residential blocks, a communication hub, a center for tactical operations, storage facilities, a training center, a medical center, repair facilities a center for logistics, a canteen, recreation facilities and a doghouse. They plan to put the complex into operation in late 2012 early 2012. In longer perspective 2012-2016 the US Central Command plans to allocate another $3.8 billion on the construction of military facilities in the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia.

Even a brief look at the deployment of the US military objects shows that it almost fully repeats the geography of “the Eurasian Balkans” of Z. Brzezinski, who gave this geopolitical region a decisive role in fighting Russia on “the Grand Chessboard”. By locating its special troops, surveillance equipment and other forces in Central Asia and in the Caucasus after the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in 2011 the US will ensure its military presence right besides Russia’s “belly” near the northern border of Iran and the western border of China. Here the Americans plan to deploy an intelligence network which will ensure control over the situation in the most important points of Eurasia.

(Views expressed in this article reflect the author's opinion and do not necessarily reflect those of RIA Novosti news agency. RIA Novosti does not vouch for facts and quotes mentioned in the story)

Russia’s great gas game

RUSSIA and the European Union are geopolitical neighbours. Whether or not their relationship is in fact neighbourly, rather than tense and confrontational, is of critical importance to both.

Unless it modernises its economy and society, Russia can forget its claim to status as a world power in the 21st century and will continue to fall behind both old and newly emerging powers. Moreover, Russia needs partners for its modernisation, because its population and economic potential are too small for it to play an important role by itself in the emerging new world order. Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be insufficient to ensure it a place among first-rank powers.

But where can Russia turn? Towards East Asia? To the south and the Islamic world? Neither of these is a serious option. As it is, Russia can turn only towards the West, and to Europe in particular.
For Europe, however, Russia’s role is of critical strategic importance. Even a partial revision of the post-Soviet order in the direction of an increased Russian grip on ex-Soviet states or satellites would drastically change EU strategy and security policy.
Both sides claim to want improved bilateral relations, but there is room for doubt about whether Russians and Europeans actually think about their relations in the same terms. A look beyond the cordial rhetoric reveals profound differences.
When Russia’s former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared several years ago that the greatest disaster of the 20th century was the demise of the Soviet Union, he didn’t just speak for himself but arguably for the majority of Russia’s political elite. The overwhelming majority of Europeans, however, probably view the USSR’s break-up as a cause for celebration.
Indeed, today’s Russia avowedly seeks to reverse the post-Soviet order in Europe that emerged after 1989/1990, at least in parts of its neighbourhood, while the Europeans and the West want to maintain it at all costs. So long as Moscow doesn’t understand these fundamental differences and draw the right conclusions from them, Europeans won’t view Russia’s opening towards the West as an opportunity, and Russia will always encounter deep mistrust in Europe. But this doesn’t preclude practical and pragmatic co-operation in numerous areas.
Russia today has retained its strength only as a supplier of energy and other natural resources. It is therefore no surprise that Putin has sought to use this lever to rebuild Russia’s power and to revise the post-Soviet order.
Russia’s natural gas supplies to Europe play a vital role in this regard, because here, unlike in the case of oil, Russia’s bargaining position is very strong. Even more importantly, its direct neighbours are either completely dependent on Russian gas supplies — Ukraine and Belarus — or, like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, are dependent on Russia’s pipeline system to sell their gas output.
Russia certainly pursues economic interests with its gas-export policy — all the more so when gas prices are trending down — and it wants to expand its role on the European gas market to intensify the dependencies that now exist. But this is unlikely: Russia’s disruption of gas supplies in January 2009 made clear to the EU in no uncertain terms what price might have to be paid.
That is why “diversification of gas-supplier countries” has since been EU policy — including, first and foremost, the Nabucco pipeline project, which would open a southern corridor between the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, northern Iraq and Europe. Nabucco would reach Europe via Turkey and would drastically reduce Caspian supplier countries’ dependence on Russia’s pipelines, and the new southeastern EU members’ dependence on Russian gas supplies. So it comes as no surprise that the Kremlin is trying to scupper Nabucco.
Two other developments promise to prevent increased European dependence on Russia: massive expansion of liquefied gas imports into the EU and — linked to this and to deregulation of the European gas market — the transition from long-term supply agreements and the oil-price peg to market-dependent spot prices.

Nonetheless, the primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic, but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe — a quest that is not about the EU as much as it is about Ukraine.

Ukraine’s new Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, was stunned when Putin unexpectedly confronted him during a joint press conference with a suggestion to merge the Ukrainian and Russian gas companies. Unlike the Ukraine government’s assent to extending the Russian Black Sea fleet’s deployment in Crimea — a decision that led to physical violence in Ukraine’s parliament — this was not a prolongation of the status quo, but a public demand for its revision.—GN

Tags:Russia AzerbaijanEuropean UnionSouth Caucasus Natural gasGeorgia (Republic)