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‏Arjun tanks لیبل والی اشاعتیں دکھا رہا ہے۔ سبھی اشاعتیں دکھائیں
‏Arjun tanks لیبل والی اشاعتیں دکھا رہا ہے۔ سبھی اشاعتیں دکھائیں

منگل، 22 جون، 2010

West Bengal: A Year Of Failure

West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee yesterday said there was no easy solution to the Maoist challenge and the issue had become “very complicated” due to support to the rebels by the main opposition Trinamul Congress and others.

Admitting that the killings and terror unleashed by the leftwing extremists in parts of the state posed a big problem, Bhattacharjee said the government was meeting the challenge through political and administrative actions.

“But the main opposition party, some organisations and individuals are providing direct and indirect encouragement to the guerrillas. This has made the problem more complicated,” the chief minister said.

However, he stressed that the Maoist issue was basically a political problem and had to be dealt with politically.

Bhattacharjee said the problem had to be viewed in the all-India context as the rebels were active in seven to eight states.

“Since they have chosen areas which are remote and populated by the poorest sections of the society, we have to take socio-economic programmes to isolate them. On the other hand, we have to activate the police and the administration and fight them politically also,” Bhattacharjee told a Bengali newspaper on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Left Front government’s uninterrupted rule in the state.

Bhattacharjee said his government was working on all flanks to combat the rebels. “But it is a long-drawn battle. There is no easy solution.”

Meanwhile, suspected rebels killed a Communist party of India (Marxist) activist in Ranibandh village in West Bengal’s Bankura district.

Police sources said Sachidananda Karmakar, a CPM local committee leader was dragged from his residence on Sunday night by a group of leftwing rebels.

“Sachidananda’s body was recovered today morning from a road nearby. A few posters of Maoists claiming responsibility for the death was found,” said an officer of Ranibandh police station.

The posters read: “Sachidananda was killed for acting as a police informer.”

Also yesterday, two main suspects in last month’s Gyaneshwari Express train crash in which 151 people died, were taken to West Bengal by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from Ranchi.

Bapi Mahato, who was arrested on Sunday from a guest house in Jamshedpur, was yesterday presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) of Saraikela, Indrason Yadav.

The court granted permission to the CBI to take Bapi Mahato and his cousin Bimal Mahato, arrested for sheltering Bapi in Jharkhand, into its custody and present them in the additional CJM’s court of Jhargram in West Bengal by tomorrow.

“Bapi Mahato was taken to Jhargram by a helicopter by the CBI. They were taken to Jhargram after a CJM court granted their transit remand to the CBI,” Seraikela Kharsawa District Superintendent of Police Abhishek said.

Bapi Mahato was a prominent leader of the militant wing of the West Bengal-based tribal body People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCAPA), West Bengal police officials said.

Meanwhile, the anti-Maoist offensive in Chhattisgarh’s restive Bastar region has slowed down due to rains, an official said.

“There is always a big problem going deep into hilly jungle terrain amid monsoon rains to hit open-air jungle hideouts of Maoists where the risk of landslides is very high,” a senior police official said.

The Bastar region, considered a Maoist hotbed, includes five districts - Narayanpur, Kanker, Bastar, Bijapur and Dantewada. The region covers nearly 40,000sq km area of which, according to police, up to 25,000sq km is intensively mined.

In April, Maoists carried out their biggest ever strike in Dantewada district and killed 76 security men.


West Bengal: A Year Of Failure

Police claimed that at least 12 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were killed, and ‘many others’ were injured, in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) at Duli village near Ranja Forest in the Salboni Police Station area of West Midnapore District of West Bengal on June 16, 2010. Eight bodies were actually recovered, though senior Police officials said they had "information that four of the bodies were carried away by Maoists".

In their desperation to demonstrate a ‘notable success’ after more than a year of virtual breakdown in the West Midnapore District, the SFs, including both State Police and Central Paramilitary Force (CPMF) personnel, disgraced themselves by parading the enemy fallen strung out on poles like animal carcasses, to be photographed by the Press. One ‘dreaded Naxalite’ also exhibited before the media, moreover, turned out to be a mentally challenged mute, reportedly from a village near the site of the encounter at Duli.

While the response from Delhi has been quick, condemning the manner in which the Maoist dead were flaunted before the media, significant damage had already been done. The incident will certainly provide grist for the CPI-Maoist propaganda mill. Crucially, however, it also demonstrates the unpreparedness – if not the incompetence – of the SFs to deal with the complexities of the campaign against the Maoists. While political rhetoric continues to muddy the issue with talk of ‘our own people’ and ‘political solutions’, with the Centre making repeated and gratuitous offers of ‘talks’ with the Maoists, the message that has gone down to the Forces appears to be to chalk up as many ‘kills’ as possible, and to use these in brutal displays of dominance across territories that are only nominally in the state’s control. Whether or not such ‘kills’ constitute any enduring gains within the context of a sustained counterinsurgency (CI) strategy seems irrelevant.

This is not to suggest that the state has not had some manifest successes beyond the macabre tally of Maoist fatalities. Bapi Mahato, a senior member of the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA), the Maoist-backed grouping spearheading the disturbances in West Midnapore, was arrested by a joint team of the West Bengal and Jharkhand Police from the Adityapur area of Jamshedpur in Jharkhand on June 20, 2010. Mahato is the principal accused in the Gyaneshwari Express incident in which 148 persons were killed. Earlier, on June 4, Khagen Mahato, another prominent PCPA member, was arrested from Kharagpur in West Midnapore. On March 2, 2010, Venkateswar Reddy aka Telugu Dipak, was arrested from Sarshuna near Calcutta. Dipak was the suspected mastermind of the February 15, 2010, attack on the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) camp at Silda, in which 24 EFR personnel and one civilian were killed. On June 18, 2010, State Chief Secretary Ardhendu Sen disclosed, moreover, that SFs operating in the Jungalmahal area, which includes Bankura, Purulia and West Midnapore Districts, had arrested ‘about 400 to 500 Maoists’, though Koteswar Rao aka Kishanji, CPI-Maoist Politburo member in charge of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa, and the brain behind almost all the Maoist attacks in this region, remained elusive.

Nevertheless, Police sources argue, the Duli operation reflects a new phase of the conflict around Lalgarh, which commenced in November 2008, after a failed assassination attempt targeting the State’s Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya. West Midnapore Superintendent of Police (SP) Manoj Verma, thus asserted, on June 17, "The situation in Lalgarh on 18th June 2009 was that the Police couldn't enter the area. They couldn't leave Police Stations. They couldn't serve people. In comparison, today there is no such place that the Police cannot enter."

It was on June 18, 2009 that the joint SFs, comprising State Police and CPMF personnel, had launched their offensive against the Maoists in Lalgarh. For almost an year since then [till June 15, 2010] more than 4,000 troops launched repeated operations in Lalgarh and its adjacent areas, but failed to inflict any significant damage on the Maoist networks [there are currently an estimated 27 companies of CPMFs and 20 companies of State Armed Police operating in the area]. According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), a total of 28 Maoists had been killed during this entire period, as compared to 41 SFs. Moreover, a staggering total of 304 civilians had been killed by the Maoists in an around Lalgarh, including 148 killed in the Gyaneshwari Express derailment incident on May 28, 2010. The most significant Maoist attacks included:

May 28, 2010: At least 148 passengers were killed when cadres of the Maoist-backed PCPA sabotaged the railway track between Khemasoli and Sardiha Railway Stations near Jhargram in West Midnapore District, causing the derailment of 13 coaches of the Gyaneshwari Express. Another 145 persons suffered injuries.

February 15, 2010: Over 100 armed CPI-Maoist cadres attacked the paramilitary Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) camp at Silda, just 30 kilometers from Midnapore town, in the West Midnapore District, on February 15, killing 24 EFR personnel. One civilian who was injured in the cross fire died later. Another seven troopers were also injured.

November 8, 2009: CPI-Maoist cadres killed four personnel of the EFR and looted their arms near a Police camp close to a school in Gidhni Bazaar area under Jamboni Police Station area of West Midnapore District.

The conflict around Lalgarh has passed through three distinct phases. In the first phase, between November 2008 and the first half of June 2009, the Maoists systematically fueled tribal anger and hijacked the protest movement against the Police in Lalgarh, combining this campaign with the selective killing of ruling Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) cadres [these killings still continue]. The second phase commenced on June 18, 2009, when SF operations commenced, with the Maoists mainly offering defensive resistance to the SFs, and then gradually resuming their campaign of targeted annihilation against the CPI-M cadres and the anti-Maoist Gana Pratirodh Committee. The third phase began with the attack on the Sankrail Police Station on October 20, when the Maoists initiated a direct offensive against the SFs.

The Duli incident is being projected as a turnaround in this context. Police sources insist that the Maoist power has significantly been dented by infighting. In evidence, they note that Gurucharan Kisku aka Marshal, had formed his own squad on February 12, 2010, after accusing Koteswar Rao of failing to address tribal grievances. Kisku also declared that Rao was an ‘outsider’, and did not understand ‘tribal sentiments’. Police also claim to have been approached by ‘many Maoists’ in West Bengal, who are willing to surrender. On June 17, West Bengal Director General of Police (DGP) Bhupinder Singh stated, "We have received feelers that a number of people are willing to surrender. However, I can give you neither any numbers nor other details at this juncture." The State Government had earlier announced a financial package for surrendering Maoists. The package followed Central Government guidelines, with a one-off payment of INR 150,000, vocational training for three months, and INR 2,000 in a monthly stipend for each surrendering cadre. If arms were also surrendered, they would receive INR 15,000 for an AK-47 rifle, INR 25,000 for a machine gun, and INR 3,000 for a pistol or revolver, in addition.

Tales of imminent Maoist collapse due to internal dissensions and loss of morale have, however, long been a staple of Police and intelligence folklore. Though individual conflicts have been a fact throughout the existence of the Naxalite movement, there is little reason to give credence to any expectations of an existential crisis within the rebel command structures in the foreseeable future. It would also be premature to ascribe any extraordinary strategic significance to the Duli operation, or to other SF successes, including the key arrests of the past months. The reality is that Maoist capacities in the area – and in the wider theatres they have come to dominate along India’s eastern board – show every sign of expansion, rather than any dramatic contraction, in the face of, at best, occasional SF successes.

Unconfirmed news reports, for instance, claim that at least 7,000 armed Maoists were active across the West Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura Districts in West Bengal, and beyond, into the East Singhbhum District in the neighbouring State of Jharkhand. The numbers are not entirely incredible, if both armed Maoist squads and the people’s militia are taken into account. The Maoists have demonstrated capacities to assemble several hundred cadres and militia in several operations and, in some cases, such numbers have run well over a thousand. In the February 2, 2010, incident at a Police Station in the Bankura District, for instance, a mob of an estimated 2,000 persons had assembled to confront the Police. Similarly, on May 3, 2009, several thousand tribals and villagers backed by Maoist armed cadres had overrun and destroyed Government buildings at the Kalaimuri Police Camp near Lalgarh.

Maoist recruitment also continues in full swing in the Jangalmahal area, with reports suggesting that mobilisers are targeting and training significant numbers of teenagers as well. On May 11, 2010, West Midnapore SP Manoj Verma had disclosed that "Maoists have often been pushing teenagers into the frontlines of action. The boys are offered a monthly amount of INR 2, 500." In the June 16 incident, Police records indicate that six of the dead were about 15 or 16 years old. Bela, the eldest female cadre killed, was a 20-year-old.

The Duli incident also demonstrated the robust networks that exist across the West Bengal – Jharkhand State borders. One of the dead, Arjun, has been identified as a member of a squad led by Bikash in Jharkhand, and forested areas along the Jharkhand-West Bengal as well as the Orissa-West Bengal border have been dominated by the Maoists for years now.

Significantly, within West Bengal, according to statistics compiled by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, between January 1, 2010, and May 30, 2010, the Maoists had killed 291 persons, including 230 civilians and 61 SF personnel. The ICM database put this toll at 249, including 217 civilians and 32 SF personnel. Significantly, most of these fatalities occurred within the West Midnapore District, within which Lalgarh falls; and all but one of these occurred in the Jangalmahal area.

The Maoists also continue to draw significant support from ‘civil society’ groups, despite the Union Government’s threat that anyone found supporting the Maoists would be dealt with ‘sternly’. A day before the June 16 encounter, Police arrested three persons from Kolkata — a scientist, a college teacher and a writer — and 10 PCPA cadres from the area around the encounter site.

Worse, in the election-bound State, the rivalry between the ruling CPI-M and the opposition Trinamool Congress led by Union Minister of Railways Mamata Banerjee, has undermined any possible political agreement on dealing with the Maoists. Mamta Banrjee, had, in fact, blamed the CPI-M for the Gyaneshwari Express derailment, and had demanded a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe. On June 17, however, the CBI named three cadres of the PCPA - Bapi Mahato, Umakanta Mahato and Asit Mahato – as the key accused in the case and declared a cash reward of INR 100,000 for information on their whereabouts.

There is, of course, much talk of significant capacity augmentation in CI Forces in West Bengal. The State’s DGP has spoken about raising a 1,000-strong CI Force patterned on the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh, and a Special Combat Force of 3,500 personnel. The State Government has also urged the Centre to augment deployment of CPMFs in the affected area. All this, however, remains very much in the future. For the moment, the Maoists retain ample capacities to disrupt governance and to harass and selectively target the SFs. And, for each CI ‘success’, the Maoists are still chalking up several of their own.

جمعرات، 17 جون، 2010

Arjun Tank Trouble

More than 30 years after the project was conceptualised, the Indian Army will finally have a sizeable number of the indigenously developed Arjun tanks in its inventory. With the order for 124 additional tanks finalised by the government, the Army will have close to 250 Arjun MKI tanks in its mechanised forces over the next few years as the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment ramps up production.

The Army, on its part, is looking forward to the Arjun MK II, an improved, new, next generation tank that will meet its future requirements. The project to develop the newer version of the tank was approved by the government last month on the recommendation of the Rama Rao Committee and on the insistence of successive top Army officers. The Arjun’s excessive dependence on foreign equipment — the engine, gun control system and gunner’s main sight are all imported — has come under criticism and DRDO wants to bring down the foreign components from 60 per cent to 30 per cent.

While the project seems to have got some respite after the Army turned around from its initial stance that the order book would be frozen at 124 to make way for a new generation tank, it has been fraught with setbacks, delays and cost overruns since being sanctioned in May 1974. DRDO was allotted Rs 15.50 crore to develop the tank within 10 years. However, the first prototype rolled out only by 1983. The project suffered repeated delays and deadlines and costs were revised on three occasions — 1980, 1987 and 2000.


When the project was officially closed by DRDO in 1996, its cost stood at Rs 306 crore. The first of the 14 pre- production versions of the tanks were handed over to the Army for trials in 2005 but they failed to satisfy. The real saga of the Arjun began post-2005 after DRDO started to aggressively push for large orders of the tank by the Army.

TRIAL FAILURES

From 2005 till the present, when the order book stands at close to 250, a series of critical reports and observations by experts have haunted the tank. Over the years, the tank failed to impress the Army, which kept pressing for improvements and modifications in order to make it combat-worthy. The tank’s dismal performance in the trials carried out in 2006 was of particular concern to the Army.

In its trial report, the Army reported problems with the laser range finder of the gunners main sight and the piston rods of the suspension system. One of the Army’s major concerns was the tank’s fuel efficiency and its trial report said that the “high fuel consumption was evident during the validation trials in June 2006”. Defence Minister A K Antony, who had been pushing for early induction of the tanks in the Army, too had to concede that problems remained. “Some more problems are there but I am hopeful that we will be able to remove that,” he said after the report was made public.

After months another batch of the improved tanks were handed over for trials in 2007-08. Again, this round of trials ended in disappointment.

After the tank failed to clear a round of winter trials, the then Army chief General Deepak Kapoor wrote to Antony saying that a “lot of improvements” are needed before the tank can be cleared for bulk intake. The letter had its roots in the five months of Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials in Rajasthan in which two Arjun tanks were tested by the Army. The tanks suffered engine failures on four separate occasions after being put through only 1,000 km of trials.

‘NEED A NEW TANK’

An Army report in April 2008 said: “The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far. The tanks have done about 1,000 km each. There is a problem”. A parliamentary panel monitoring the Arjun project then called for immediate modifications in the tank. “The causes for failure of the tank should be identified without loss of time and necessary modifications carried out at the earliest so that the tank becomes acceptable to the Army,” the panel said, adding it was “startled” over the poor performance.

A month later, in May 2008, the Defence Ministry too conceded that the tank was suffering engine failures and did not even manage to fire straight during the trials. Admitting its poor performance during the trials, the Ministry said five major faults, including low-firing accuracy, have been identified in the indigenous tank. Listing the problem areas, the then Minister of State, Defence, Rao Inderjit Singh informed Parliament that the tank had “low accuracy and consistency”, chipped its gun barrels while firing live rounds at the Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials and suffered a failure of the hydro pneumatic suspension units.

The dismal performance prompted the Army to tell DRDO that the tank should be treated as a technology demonstrator and a platform to work on a totally new tank design for the future. Months after retiring as the Director General of Mechanised Forces at Army HQ in 2008, Lt Gen K D S Shekhawat told The Indian Express that it was time for a new next generation tank. “After 30 years, the Arjun has not fructified and now we need to start with a new design and a new tank. We have always said that a next (generation) tank has to come out in due course of time. We now have a base and expertise to start on the futuristic tank,” he said.

It finally took the Rama Rao Committee, which was instituted to suggest a revamp plan for DRDO, to give a clear direction for the tank. The report said that the main reason for the repeated delays on the project was the over-optimism of developers who underestimated the time needed for making weapon systems. “Too much time and effort was spent in developing an engine for the tank without meeting success. DRDO looked at outsourcing turret control systems only in the mid-eighties after failing to develop it in-house. Inexperienced and overoptimistic developers underestimated the time required. The tank suffered from poor product quality and sub-optimal performance during development, testing and production stage,” said the report. “DRDO should immediately start work on a MK II version of the tank to meet requirements of the Army”. It also said advanced versions should be built on a “joint development model and foreign collaborators should be roped in to gain expertise”.


After repeated improvements, the first regiment of the Arjun — 124 had been originally ordered at the start of the project — was officially inducted into the Army in May 2009. The first armoured regiment of 45 tanks was inducted symbolically on the day Antony took charge in his second term as the Defence Minister.

The decision to induct the regiment came after DRDO carried out major modifications to suit the Army’s needs. A major improvement was modifications in the transmission by its German manufacturer, Renk. The failure of the transmission had been identified by DRDO as the main reason for the repeated engine failures during the trials. Improvements were also carried out on the suspension system.

THE ARJUN VS T-90 DEBATE

Since the first induction, there was immense pressure from the DRDO on the Army to conduct comparative trials between the Arjun tank and the T 90 MBT. However, the unfairness of comparing two different tanks rankled experts both within and outside the military establishment.

With adequate pressure from the ministry, the trials were carried out earlier this year but reluctantly, as the huge difference in the class of the two tanks did not leave much scope for comparison. The biggest difference is the weight. At 58.5 tons, the Arjun is more than 10 tons heavier than the T 90. The added weight and size gives it several advantages over the Russian machine in terms of more armour, greater capability to carry ammunition as well as extra sensors.

DRDO on its part said at that time that there is “room for both tanks” in the Army’s inventory and the trials were carried out to find a role for the Arjun tank in the Army. While the report has not yet been made public, the DRDO officials have said the trials were successful and the Arjun’s performance has been satisfactory for the Army. After more than 10 years of trials and improvements, the tank was finally found fit for limited induction.

The additional order for 124 more tanks is being seen as a victory of sorts for the Arjun but after more than three decades in development. The Arjun is the smallest part of the Indian tank fleet, well behind the T 90 and T 72 tanks that make up the armoured backbone of the Army. This is still a far cry from the concept behind the development of an indigenous Arjun tank. The whole idea was to develop the Arjun as the Army’s main battle tank to reduce dependence on imports. However, the frequent delays in the project appears to have given the Armed Forces a tank that will only be produced in limited numbers and is likely to get outdated after just a decade of service.

While DRDO is pushing for larger orders of the Arjun to justify developmental costs, the Army is constrained by the fact that it has already ordered sizeable number of the T 90 tanks to fulfill current requirements. Experts say it takes several years to train and optimise crews and tactics for a new class of tanks. Interestingly, while creating new infrastructure and training personnel means extra finances, the Army also finds it hard to justify the cost of the Arjun tank that comes close to Rs 17 crore per piece. On the other hand, the ready-to-use, battle-hardy and in-production T 90 tank costs the Army around Rs 13 crore per tank. And, this cost would go down progressively as the Avadi Ordnance Factory churns out T 90s in larger numbers.

The mainstay battle tank of the Army is the T 90 that was first ordered from Russia in 2001. The Army has placed orders for 660 T 90s from Russia to replace the ageing fleet of T 72s. The orders were placed again in 2007 after it became clear that the Arjun was not even close to induction. In addition, over 1000 T 90s will be manufactured at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory. Given Arjun’s slow progress, the Army has also decided to upgrade 650 of the older T 72s.


FIREPOWER

The tank has a 120 mm calibre rifled gun that fires indigenously developed Fin Stabilised Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (FSAPDS) ammunition. It has a German-origin computer-controlled fire control system with an all-weather sighting system. The DRDO says that this gives the Arjun a “very high first round hit probability and reduced reaction time”.

Main Armament

The rifled 120 mm gun is the main fire power of the tank that is designed to beat the armour used by contemporary tanks. While the tank cannot fire missiles from the gun like the one atop the T 90 tank, DRDO says that the capability has been demonstrated and can be incorporated if required.

Secondary Armament

The Arjun has a co-axial 7.62 mm machine gun for an anti-personnel role and a 12.7 mm machine gun for anti-aircraft and ground targets, similar to the T 90 Main Battle Tank (MBT).

Gunner’s Main Sight

The Delft-SAGEM Gunner’s Main Sight that has been imported from Belgium, has all weather, day-night capability. The thermal imager gives the gunner night vision and also the ability to engage targets even in the presence of haze, dust or smoke.

Panoramic Sight

The tank commander has a “panoramic sight” that gives him an “all round surveillance” capability. Without removing eyes from the sight and despite the turret motion, a stable a view of the environment is available. This view can also be magnified if the need arises.

Ammunition

The Arjun is being equipped with two types of ammunition, the FSAPDS ammunition is the main battle ammunition of the tank and has performed satisfactorily in trials. The tank will also have High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) ammunition. DRDO is also developing an anti-helicopter round to combat aerial threats.

MOBILITY

One of the major systems imported for the Arjun is the power plant provided by German company MTU. The transmission has been imported from German company Renk. The tracks are being manufactured by Larsen and Toubro but are again of German origin.

The Arjun has come under criticism for the hydro-pneumatic suspension. While the new generation suspension makes the tank a very stable platform for firing , the system requires high maintenance and is prone to failures.

PROTECTION

The main feature of the protection system is the indigenously developed Kanchan armour. The developer claims that the armour gives the tank much better protection than current Russian origin tanks in the Army’s inventory. In its trials in 2000, the armour withstood a direct hit from a T 72 tank at point blank range. Newer versions of the tank may be equipped with a new reactive armour under development by the DRDO.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tank-trouble/634841/0