The year 2011 carries immense
significance in terms of developments in the Af-Pak theatre. The year
saw the killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in a night raid by US special
forces in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011. OBL’s killing followed announcements by various NATO countries,
especially France, Canada,
Germany and UK, to start gradual withdrawal troops from Afghanistan.
This was spurred by an earlier speech on 22 June by US President Barak
Obama to start pulling out US troops in July 2011, and completing a
complete pullout by 2014. Coupled with this was a rapid deterioration in
Pakistan-US relations, where intelligence and security cooperation is
reported to be at an all-time low.
Similarly, there was a complete overhaul
of the US team overseeing the US policy in Afghanistan. Leon Panetta
succeeded Roberts Gates as the new US Defense Secretary, while General
Petraeus was appointed as the new CIA head in place of Panetta.
Meanwhile, a gradual handover of security responsibilities by NATO to
the Afghan forces also commenced in July 2011.
All these developments are ominous for
the Af-Pak theatre since they may prove to be the harbinger for a future
course of action that the US and NATO may adopt towards the Af-Pak
region. It seems there has been a visible shift in the mindset of policy
makers in Washington and Brussels.
Firstly, greater emphasis is being
placed on Pakistan as the “ground zero” of terrorism instead of
Afghanistan, which was earlier perceived as the centre of gravity of
terrorism. Statements by US policy makers and Congressmen that the
short- and long-term terrorist threat to the US security emanates from
Pakistan’s western border regions instead of Afghanistan points towards
this direction. From a Pakistani perspective, NATO’s future orientation
could shift from Af-Pak to Pak-Af.
Secondly, a gradual troop drawdown by
NATO is pointing toward a shift from counter-insurgency (COIN) to
counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. Former US Secretary of Defense, Roberts
Gates, hinted at this transition when he stated in June 2011 that NATO’s
mission “will be less and less COIN and more and more
counter-terrorism.” While US and NATO troops were redeployed in late
2009 from eastern and southeastern Afghanistan to southern Afghanistan
in order to undertake COIN operations in Helmand and Kandahar, there are
reports that NATO is now contemplating to redeploy once more its
resources – both human and material - to southeastern Afghanistan (Khost,
Pakita and Paktika) which borders North and South Waziristan agencies of
FATA region of Pakistan. NATO strategy therefore would rely heavily on
neutralising terrorist entities holed up in the FATA region through
intensification of drone strikes. While the US has not undertaken a
ground operation in FATA so far due to Pakistani sensitivities, the US
leadership is already making it clear that they will not desist from
unilateral ground operations, if there is actionable intelligence
regarding presence of high profile terrorist on the Pakistani territory.
To ward off any adverse Pakistani reaction, NATO is already diversifying
its logistics dependence on Pakistan by opening up more ground routes
from Afghanistan’s north. According to reports, NATO dependence on
Pakistan’s logistics route has dwindled from 90 percent in 2008 to 60
percent by 2011.
However, there are certain pitfalls that
the western security alliance should guard itself against. Firstly, the
US strategy from 2002 until 2008 focussed heavily on FATA, under which
it maintained significant military presence in Afghanistan’s
southeastern province. A heavy focus on eliminating al-Qaeda kept the US
off guard against Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan’s southern
provinces. Under the evolving strategy, NATO shift from south to
southeast and lead them towards repeating the same mistake. While NATO
claims that Taliban in southern Afghanistan are on the retreat, it could
hardly be substantiated. It seems Taliban are adopting a new strategy of
playing “cat-and-mouse” game by going into hiding and reemerging in the
same area after the focus is taken off. Similarly, the Afghan security
forces remain weak to counter a Taliban offensive if the former is put
into action. The fact that a highly organised, trained and disciplined
Pakistani security force has not been able to completely wipe out the
Taliban in its multiple military operations in FATA and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) shows the potency of the Taliban insurgency. Similarly,
a corrupt, inefficient and crude governance system in Afghanistan allows
the Afghan Taliban to present themselves as an alternative to the
corrupt Afghan government in power.
Similarly, Taliban is not a static
phenomenon but remains fluid, since they have so far shown great
resilience, mobility and adaptability. With the US shifting their focus
on southeastern Afghanistan, the Taliban may try to find new sanctuaries
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in northern Afghanistan and
upper parts of FATA and KP to survive the NATO’s move. Already, Taliban
and al-Qaeda have been able to establish semi-sanctuaries in Kunar and
Nuristan provinces in eastern parts of Afghanistan, where they intend to
reverse the fragile security gains both Afghanistan and NATO had made
since 2008. By destabilising Kunar, Nuristan and the Malakand Division,
Bajaur and Mohmand agencies of
Pakistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda
want to create a strategic depth which could prove to be a rearguard if
they are attacked by either NATO, Afghan or Pakistani troops in the
future.
Similarly, NATO’s “fight and talk”
strategy has not bore the desirable results it had hoped for. The
Taliban and other insurgent groups remain unwilling to hold talks with
the Afghan government and NATO. An emphasis on CT could weaken the
existing leadership of the insurgent groups, but the latter have shown
profound adaptability in filling up their ranks quickly and efficiently.
In fact, the neo-Taliban are proving to be more hardliners in their
approach, compared to the old guard so far. The NATO would be in a fix
if this current CT policy also fails in the long run since they will
lose whatever leverage they have gained in the battlefield against the
insurgents so far. To quote a phrase, “you cannot win on the negotiating
table what you have lost on the battleground.”
What has been absent so far in the
entire discourse on a future political settlement of the Afghan
imbroglio is NATO’s inability to engage Afghanistan’s neighbours in
developing a regional outlook of the Afghan quagmire. So far, efforts
have focused on bilateral engagements and lack a multilateral approach.
While neighbouring countries seem to pursue conflicting interests in
Afghanistan, they also share common concerns, such as US’ efforts to
acquire military bases in Afghanistan on a long-term basis. Similarly,
narco-production and its trafficking as well as spillover of the Afghan
instability into the Middle East, South and
Central Asia are concerns that
are jointly shared by the regional countries. It is pertinent to mention
that the conflict in Afghanistan was confined only within boundaries
pre-September 2001, which has now spread to cover not only significant
parts of Pakistan, but has also spread to Iran and Central Asia as well.
Hence, their stakes in a future settlement in Afghanistan have become
dire. It is imperative that the US and NATO should deepen their
engagement with Pakistan, since it is only through joint and coordinated
actions on both sides of the Af-Pak border which could help in weakening
the Taliban as well as effecting a political solution to the Afghan
conflict.
The withdrawal of NATO forces and a
shift in strategy from COIN to CT could be viewed as the beginning of a
new phase in Afghanistan, which is a
departure from the status quo that prevailed since the signing of Bonn
Accord in December 2001. These developments would have wider
implications and could prove decisive in the success or failure of the
international effort to stabilise the war-ravaged country.
_________________________________________________
By Alia Qaim:
The author is a graduate of University
of Peshawar and London School of Economics (UK).
She is currently pursuing her doctoral studies at University of
London. Her dissertation focuses on the current insurgencies in the Af-Pak
region.
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