Delhi would do well to remember as well that all its support to the regime of Mohammad Najibullah-political, military, security and economic- still did not prevent the regime from collapsing in 1992 when the mujahideen came knocking on the doors of Kabul.
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President Hamid Karzai’s two-day
visit to India presages a major realignment of regional powers over the Afghan problem.
India has taken a
carefully thought-out decision to pitch for a key role in the
so-called “endgame” in Afghanistan, commensurate with its
aspirations as a regional power and in defence of what it
considers to be its vital interests against the backdrop of a
developing situation about which it is genuinely concerned.
India, however, will not get away unchallenged in its newfound "pro-activism"
and how the ensuing regional rivalries will play out in the
coming period remains far from clear. The cloudy horizons may
have got just a bit darker as Karzai's presidential jet takes
off from the Indian capital on Wednesday.
Karzai, too, had a mission on
his mind as he headed for Delhi. Late on Monday evening, on the
eve of his departure for India, he spoke candidly about his
political predicament. His much-touted reconciliation policy
toward the Taliban is at a dead-end and for crafting a way
forward he needs to get a fresh mandate from a loya jirga
(tribal assembly) that will be convened for the purpose.
He blamed Pakistan for being
uncooperative in the peace process and yet he acknowledged that
he needed to talk to Islamabad, being mindful that it also is
what the United States and the international community want him
to do - despite the wave of "anti-Pakistan" sentiments sweeping
large sections of Afghan society and notwithstanding the deep
and entrenched aversion to any truck with Pakistan over the
Taliban that many figures within his own coalition harbor.
The leadership in Kabul has
traditionally reached out to India as a counterweight to
Pakistan. Karzai's visit to Delhi (his second visit in seven
months) falls within that classic mould, but what gives added
dimension to his mission is that his principal political allies
at home - groups belonging to the erstwhile Northern Alliance
(NA) - also happen to be forces closely associated with India
for the past several years.
His two vice presidents,
Mohammed Fahim and Karim Khalili, were leading figures in the
anti-Taliban resistance, which
India promoted, and Fahim, in particular, is the inheritor of the war machine
of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud who was substantially supported
by the Indian security establishment during the anti-Taliban
resistance of the late 1990s.
If Delhi has decided to take the
plunge and stand overtly behind the Karzai-Fahim-Khalili axis of
power that is taking shape in Kabul, it is because the Indian
political leadership is acceding to certain compelling reasons
given by the country's security establishment.
First and foremost, there is
deep disillusionment over United States policies and a resultant
feeling that India must pursue an independent course in
Afghanistan to safeguard its security interests. The US's
pattern of intermittently quarreling and depending on Pakistan
to advance its regional strategy in Afghanistan exasperates the
Indian establishment.
Just as Indian pundits concluded
that the recent rift in US-Pakistan ties was far too advanced to
lend itself to repair, Washington has once again kissed and made
up with Islamabad. New details have begun emerging that the US
Central Intelligence Agency might have taken the help of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence in contacting the Haqqani
network and that the US would have offered the Haqqanis a place
in the Afghan government.
The fact that the US and
Pakistan may be working together to finesse the Haqqani network
(which India holds responsible for the two murderous attacks on
its embassy in Kabul) and bring it into the peace process
horrifies Delhi and it runs contrary to repeated American
assurances to Indian officials.
Besides, Delhi is convinced that
Pakistan masterminded the assassination of the head of the
Afghan High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was close to
India, as part of a calculated plan to systematically remove
from the political chessboard all figures who may challenge
Taliban supremacy in the coming period, especially as the
drawdown of US troops accelerates.
Three-pronged strategy
Within the framework of the
dialogue with Pakistan, the Indian leadership had somewhat
exercised self-restraint in robustly advancing its interests in
Afghanistan in the recent period, but the Indian security
establishment seems to have concluded that Islamabad is pushing
the envelope nonetheless, aimed at exterminating all Indian
influence in Kabul in a future set-up dominated by its Taliban
proxies.
Equally, Delhi is not convinced
about the efficacy of the troop drawdown plan of President
Barack Obama. Ironically, India shares the skepticism recently
voiced by Pakistani army chief Pervez Kiani as to whether the
2014 timeline to hand over responsibility to the Afghan security
forces is realistic under the prevailing circumstances.
Thus, India is taking matters in
its own hands, so to speak, to do what it can to ensure that the
present power structure in Kabul (which is very well-disposed
toward India) gains resilience in the near future.
The concrete outcome of Karzai's
visit to India is three-fold and it reveals the range of Indian thinking. First,
India is poised to step in for
the first time in the post-Taliban era to fulfill a role that it
used to perform before the mujahideen takeover in 1992 when
Afghanistan was under the communist regime - namely, a
commitment to be a mentor of the Afghan security forces.
Second, Delhi is making a strong
pitch for a major role in the exploitation of the multi-trillion
dollar mineral resources in Afghanistan. Third, India and
Afghanistan have decided to work on their respective bilateral
cooperation grids with Iran with a view to developing a trade
and transit route through Iranian territory, bypassing Pakistan.
Clearly, India visualizes the
non-Pashtun groups in central and northern Afghanistan as a
bulwark against a Taliban takeover in the country. Yet,
India will insistently maintain that its dealings with these groups will be
strictly within the framework of a state-to-state relationship,
given the alchemy of the political structure in
Kabul supporting Karzai.
The point is, Tajik officer
corps practically dominate Afghan forces and Delhi can be
confident that they can be trusted to resist a return to power
of forces such as the Haqqanis supported by Pakistan. In short,
Delhi is virtually falling back on the raison d'etre of its
policy to support the NA in the late 1990s.
Delhi doesn't rule out the
possibility of another outbreak of civil war in
Afghanistan. It is reviving its
interest in "operationalizing" an airstrip it built in
Tajikistan out of its own funds and has sought permission from
Dushanbe to reopen a military hospital it built in the late
1990s at Farkhor on the Afghan border to provide medical
treatment to the NA warriors fighting the Taliban.
Pakistan is sure to perceive the
forthcoming Indian role as mentor of the Afghan forces and
Delhi's decision to resuscitate its infrastructure in Tajikistan
that used to provide underpinnings for the erstwhile NA's
militia as moves directed against its "legitimate interests" in
Afghanistan. The stage is getting set for a rather vicious
eruption of Pakistan-India animosities. Pakistan's
"asymmetrical" response in the past typically took the form of
terrorist strikes at targeted Indian interests.
Indian restraint was commendable
in the past when faced with the challenge of terrorism, but
there is a school of thinking in the Indian strategic community
that it is about time that India calls the Pakistani bluff. At
any rate, India seems to anticipate troubled times ahead and has
just begun a massive two-month military exercise on its desert
border with Pakistan in Rajasthan sector, involving some 20,000
troops belonging to its strike corps and its air force, with an
ambitious agenda to test its offensive plans to capture and hold
enemy territory deep inside.
Second, Delhi is encouraging
Indian business to invest in Afghanistan's mineral resources by
way of emerging as a "stakeholder" in that country. Delhi is
currently pushing a policy of acquiring strategic "assets"
abroad and Afghanistan's vast mineral resources offer big scope
for Indian investment.
Indian corporate giants are
getting interested in the proposition, too. An Indian consortium
is preparing to participate in the tender for the Hajigak iron
ores in Afghanistan, which is estimated to hold reserves of 1.8
billion tonnes. The two memoranda of understanding signed during
Karzai's visit to Delhi - relating to the field of mineral
exploitation and the development of hydrocarbon - signal the
shared interest of the two countries in facilitating large-scale
Indian investments in Afghanistan.
To be sure, India's moves in
this regard will be keenly watched by other countries,
especially China and the US, which are already neck-deep in the
scramble for resources in Central Asia. For the first time in
the post-Soviet era, India is spreading its wings in the region
and is scouting for "assets". While it lags far behind China, it
seems to estimate that the game is far from over.
Third, India's main challenge
with regard to a trade and transit route to Afghanistan needs to
be addressed in priority terms and Karzai's visit provided a
timely opportunity to have consultations. Delhi has vaguely
spoken for over a decade regarding the importance of a Silk
Route via Iran, but a new criticality has arisen. The point is,
India cannot hope to have an effective Central Asia policy in
the absence of a viable and dependable access route to the
region.
Delhi views Iran as the obvious
choice as a partner in this regard. Despite the improved climate
in India-Pakistan relations and notwithstanding the stirrings of
a more relaxed trade regime between the two countries, no one in
his senses in Delhi quite expects that Islamabad would
facilitate an access route for India's trade and investment ties
with Afghanistan where the two countries are locked in rivalry.
Pakistan is dragging its feet
with regard to the implementation of the trade and transit
treaty it signed with Afghanistan under sustained American
prodding. India does not see any prospect of Pakistan agreeing
to include it in this treaty, as propagated by US officials.
Equally, India is far from
optimistic about the US's grandiose Silk Road project connecting the Central Asian and South Asian regions, which is
likely to be presented as a major regional initiative at a
forthcoming conference in
Istanbul on November 2.
Iran gets two suitors
Thus, finally, after some five
years of neglect, Delhi has begun dusting up the
framework of India-Iran strategic cooperation. This is no easy
task, as Tehran harbors a deep sense of hurt that Delhi
succumbed to US (and Israeli) pressures to atrophy India's ties
with Tehran. But a beginning has been made in a dramatic manner
recently with Delhi seeking a bilateral meeting with Tehran at
the highest level of leadership and the latter promptly
agreeing.
The fact that last month's
meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad took place in New York - on
American soil - was in itself invested with great political
symbolism. Clearly, Delhi was preparing the ground for Karzai's
forthcoming visit.
At any rate, Manmohan seems to
have taken a personal interest in breathing life into the
India-Iran strategic partnership, which many hold him as
responsible for stifling in recent years in deference to
American wishes.
India's rapprochement with Iran
coincides with an upswing in the latter's ties with Pakistan.
Iran is going to be assiduously courted by the two South Asian
rivals. Pakistan's efforts will be to
forge a matrix of commonality of interests with
Iran over the Afghan situation and
India's attempt will also be orientated in the same direction.
How Iran balances its multiple choices will form an absorbing template of
regional politics.
Pakistan will strive its utmost
to avoid a replay of the 1990s when Iran shared common interests
with India to resist the Taliban regime. This can only be done
by Islamabad accommodating Iran's interests in Afghanistan,
while, on the other hand, Delhi will strive to reinforce its
shared concerns with Tehran over the prospect of the ascendancy
of forces who enjoyed established links with al-Qaeda in the
past.
Pakistan will factor in that the
key to keeping India out of Afghanistan and the Central Asian
chessboard will depend on its ability to "neutralize" Iran. On
the contrary, India will view Iran's cooperation as integral to
its strategy toward Afghanistan and Central Asia.
This curious turn to regional
politics gives Iran much strategic space to maneuver vis-a-vis
the US. Washington's "containment" strategy toward Iran will be
virtually rendered ineffectual if India and Pakistan ignore it
and forge strategic links with Tehran.
The US will inevitably come to
view Indian "proactivism" in Afghanistan with a sense of
disquiet, just as it hopes to work with Pakistan to reconcile
the Taliban and to bring on board the intransigent Haqqanis.
Again, India is identifying itself as, arguably, the strongest
supporter of Karzai in the region at a time when the US is
patently disillusioned with the Afghan leader and is counting on
the remaining part of his second term in office to somehow get
over so that by 2014 a new leadership can take over in Kabul.
The US and its Western allies
and the Afghan opposition have openly welcomed Karzai's hints
that he may not seek a third term (which the Afghan constitution
also forbids) but they would know that the doughty Afghan leader
possesses acute political instincts and they may not have heard
the last word on the matter. India's seamless support for Karzai
could become a headache for the
US and its allies to dethrone him.
Delhi, on the other hand, will
assess that its interests are best served in an alliance between
Karzai and his erstwhile NA allies perpetuating their hold on
power. The bottom line is that Karzai's coalition comprising
powerful NA satraps serves Indian interests. The strong
expression of support to Karzai by Manmohan leaves no one in
doubt as to the thinking in the security establishment in Delhi
that India should go the whole hog to prop up anti-Taliban
forces in Afghanistan.
At a press conference with
Karzai on Tuesday, Manmohan said meaningfully, "India will stand
by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the
responsibility for their governance and security after the
withdrawal of international forces in 2014."
Karzai echoed his trust in the
Indian commitment by pointing out that the strategic agreement
with India that was signed during his visit was the first such
agreement Afghanistan had ever concluded. He seems to have
implied that he was prepared to accord India the pride of place
as one of his most valuable partners. (The US-Afghan strategic
agreement is due to be signed by the time of the Bonn conference
in December.)
Again, the US will have
misgivings about the decision by Afghanistan and India to rev up
a trade and transit route via Iran. The very purpose of the US's
Silk Road project with Afghanistan as a regional hub, which it
is pushing with its European allies, aims at sidelining Iran
(and Russia) in the "new great game". Whereas, Delhi now is
showing preference to Iran for providing it with an access route
that connects it with Central Asia (and Russia).
In overall terms, Washington is
not going to be enthused by these Indian moves in Afghanistan,
even if it doesn't pour cold water on Delhi's high enthusiasm
for the Karzai regime. The US special representative on
Afghanistan, Marc Grossman, is scheduled to visit India this
week and will patiently search for rational explanations by his
Indian interlocutors, while keeping his counsel to himself.
The big question, therefore,
remains to be answered: Will it prove to be within Delhi's
capacity to advance on its own such an ambitious agenda of
all-round strategic partnership with Afghanistan? High hopes
have been raised during Karzai's visit, but the pitfalls of
Indian policies cannot escape notice, either.
India's record of fulfilling its commitments to its "allies" (not only Afghan)
has been patchy. India
repeatedly failed at critical points to bolster the NA despite
its pleas when the Taliban juggernaut began rolling into the Amu
Darya region. Meanwhile, Karzai would also know
Pakistan's centrality in any
Afghan peace process and India can never be a substitute for
Pakistan.
The situation around Iran is
central to the US's Middle East policies and the present
government in Delhi may lack the grit to
indulge in an act of strategic defiance of Washington. The
Indian elites are not inclined to allow any serious
contradiction to arise in the US-India strategic partnership in
relation to the region - although they view with extreme
distaste Washington's overtures to Beijing to step in as a
provider of security for Afghanistan and as a "stakeholder" in
the regional stability of South Asia.
All that can be said for certain
for the present is that the Indian military and security
establishment may have scored a huge propaganda point over its
rivals in Rawalpindi and Islamabad by succeeding after six years
of persistent effort to gain the status of a mentor of the
Afghan armed forces. There is a heady feeling among the
strategic community that India has at long last become a player
in the "great game".
Will Indian military advisors be
stationed in Afghanistan? If that happens, the Indian political
leadership cannot overlook the grim prospect of the nascent
dialogue process with Pakistan disintegrating in no time. It is
highly unlikely that Islamabad (or Washington) would countenance
an Indian military presence in the Hindu Kush.
At the end of it all, Delhi
would do well to remember as well that all its support to the
regime of Mohammad Najibullah - political, military, security
and economic - still did not prevent the regime from collapsing
in 1992 when the mujahideen came knocking on the doors of Kabul.
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By M K
Bhadrakumar (The Statesman)
