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By Ahmed Quraishi
The CIA has been playing
Pakistan like a football since 2004. It has turned Pakistan’s
nuclear programme into a Mexican soap, planting stories in
episodes meant to embarrass Pakistan and undermine its global
nuclear standing.
While covert CIA operators
allowed into the country by Zardari government take positions in
houses around the residence of Dr. Khan, American journalists in
the Pakistani capital have clear orders to keep an eye on the
Pakistani scientist. The latest example of this is the New York
Times story of July 7 on a North Korean document allegedly
procured from Dr. Khan.
Whatever the CIA and its mainly
American media conduits frequently circulate about Pakistan’s
nuclear programme and Dr. Khan, the mess is a direct result of
Pakistani mishandling of the matter.
Despite having built world-class
military and nuclear establishments, our infighting and internal
squabbles provide foreigners openings for meddling and
blackmail.
In 2004, the CIA laid its hand
on some information about limited Pakistani cooperation with
North Korea, thanks in part to information shared by the Libyans
and Iranians.
Armed with this, CIA tried to
blackmail Pakistan and demand access to Dr. Khan. As a result,
then political government and military both acted
apologetically, accepting CIA charges at face value and asking
Dr. Khan to take the blame for cooperation with North Korea.
Dr. Khan apparently agreed, but
he says subsequent mistreatment at the hands of the government
and character-assassination in the media poisoned his own mind
and made him vengeful.
He was pushed so much against
the wall that, at some point, he apparently shared documents
containing sensitive national security secrets with his
daughter. He did this because he suspected he would be
eliminated or more likely as an act of vengeance against a
government and military that has abandoned him.
To be fair to Dr. Khan, he
continues to be a staunch defender of Pakistan’s status as a
nuclear-armed nation. As recently as June 28, 2011, he defended
Pakistan’s right to nuclear technology and weapons better than
our government. In an email interview with the German Der
Spiegel magazine, he rebuked American reports questioning
Pakistani nuclear security by saying, “There never was, there is
not and there never will be any threat to our nuclear assets.”
He also offered excellent
information on international players involved in nuclear
proliferation and how there is no such thing as ‘Khan Network’
or a Pakistani proliferation ring as alleged by US government
and CIA:
“International suppliers were
willing to sell to anyone able to pay and they didn’t need me
for that. The suppliers to
Libya and Iran were the same as the ones Khan Research Laboratories used. We had a
contract with North Korea for the production
of missiles. They already had their own plutonium production
program and they used plutonium in their test procedures.”
The cardinal mistake of
Pakistan’s decision makers is unnecessary weakness and
appeasement.
Pakistan entered into very
limited cooperation with North Korea sometime in the 1990s. It
exchanged limited nuclear knowhow for North Korean missile
technology. The cooperation did not violate any international
agreements. Pakistan is not a signatory to NPT. Also, Pakistan
was the target of unfair American practices aimed at obstructing
Pakistan’s legitimate nuclear
energy and weaponisation programs and had to scour the
international market for options like everyone else.
Contacts with North Korea
violated no international law. They upset the United States
though, but Pakistan’s bilateral relationships are not any third
country’s business.
More importantly, there was
nothing to be apologetic about maintaining limited contacts with
North Koreans. China is a responsible international player and
often mediates between
North Korea and the United
States.
Leadership weakness and US aid
are the only possible reasons why Pakistan’s political, military
and nuclear establishments were overly upset after CIA
accusations in 2004.
Instead of forcing Dr. Khan to
become a victim, Islamabad could have asked the
United States to back off and stop blackmailing Pakistan over
limited ties that occurred in the 1990s and were largely
necessitated by hostile American energy and nuclear policies.
The act of scapegoating Dr. Khan
was mean to say the least when he has been a target of American
and British demonisation for decades. Even the hint of a link
between this Am-Brit hot pursuit and Dr. Khan’s humiliation is
unacceptable. The fact that we helped his detractors partially
get at him is something that does not sit well with most
Pakistanis, who not only continue to see Dr. Khan as a hero but
his statements on the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons
carry more weight in public eyes than official statements.
Government protection measures
on Dr. Khan’s movements are inevitable. But the country’s
nuclear and military establishments should and must move forward
in a tangible way to remove Dr. Khan’s personal feelings of
betrayal and abandonment. No one who has so loyally served
Pakistan should be abandoned
like this. Unfortunately, our civilian and military
bureaucracies are bad in the art of retaining our best and
brightest in the best of times. There are no programmes to
instill and maintain a sense of connection and pride in retired
government officials to prevent them from switching loyalties
for money or other reasons. And then there is the official
Pakistani crass way of treating our own people to please
foreigners.
Despite any personal failings,
Dr. Khan is a proud Pakistani who would never abandon his
nation. His personal grievances need to be removed to stop an
old, angry, and a very knowledgeable man from becoming a
plaything for our enemies.
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